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Blood over Bond?  A Call to Define Kansas’s 
Requirements for Biological Fathers to Retain 
Parental Rights 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In June 2008, a Kansas couple got the call they had been waiting for.  
They had been selected as the adoptive parents to a baby girl born just 
hours earlier.  The couple went to the hospital and held their daughter for 
the first time, beginning the process to legally adopt the girl.  The birth 
mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights so the couple could 
file a petition for adoption.1  However, one month after the adoption 
petition was filed, the baby’s biological father was located and notified 
of the pending adoption proceeding, and he asserted his parental rights.2  
After a two-year legal battle ultimately decided by the Kansas Supreme 
Court, the adoptive couple found themselves with a court order to turn 
the child they had raised for two-and-a-half years over to her biological 
father.3 
In those two-and-a-half years, the adoptive parents raised the little 
girl as their own.  They celebrated holidays, took photos, and went on 
vacations.  She bonded with her parents and her older sister.  One 
decision by the Kansas Supreme Court caused this little girl to be 
removed from the only home she had ever known.  While the court 
recognized the gravity of the consequences that accompanied its 
decision,4 it nevertheless chose to abandon years of Kansas adoption law 
precedent to maintain the biological father’s parental rights. 
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 1.  In re Baby Girl P., 242 P.3d 1168, 1171 (Kan. 2010). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See id. at 1176 (remanding to the district court to conduct proceedings to effectuate change 
of custody). 
 4.  See id. at 1170 (“In this case the courts are again called upon to make the painful 
determination of whether a child should reside with a natural parent, who has the emotional bonds 
that follow from biological fatherhood, or with prospective adoptive parents, whose emotional bonds 
have evolved over many months of loving, supporting, and caring for the child.  It is ultimately a 
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While a biological parent’s fundamental constitutional right to parent 
his child must be protected,5 recent Kansas appellate decisions have 
departed from precedent regarding the standards a biological father must 
meet to preserve his parental rights.6  The Kansas Adoption and 
Relinquishment Act (KARA) was enacted in 1990 to govern adoptions.7  
The statute instituted a process for adoptions that “includes both the 
termination of parental rights and the transfer of legal custody to, and the 
creation of legal rights in, the adoptive parents.”8  Kansas courts construe 
adoption statutes strictly in favor of maintaining the rights of biological 
parents.9 
The ambiguity of the Kansas adoption statutes and inconsistency of 
Kansas courts in interpreting the statutes, however, create unfortunate 
and detrimental results for children caught in circumstances such as 
these.  KARA must be amended to clarify the standards biological 
fathers must meet to preserve their parental rights.  Additionally, new 
procedures must be implemented to expedite parental termination 
appellate proceedings so that a child’s status does not remain unresolved 
for an extended period of time.  Although there is a wide array of 
solutions that could be considered to resolve the problems surrounding 
the termination of parental rights in favor of adoptions, amending KARA 
and implementing expedited procedures in termination proceedings are 
two solutions that could have a positive and immediate effect on Kansas 
adoptions. 
Part II.A of this Note introduces the historical controversy in 
adoption proceedings by discussing the infamous Baby Jessica case.  Part 
II.B presents background on KARA, specifically section 59-2136 of the 
                                                                                                                       
 
legal decision which this court must reach, but it is a legal decision that is shadowed by the 
heartbreak of severing human bonds.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (“[A] natural parent’s ‘desire 
for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an 
interest far more precious than any property right.” (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 27 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 
(1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child 
is constitutionally protected.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Baby Girl P., 242 P.3d at 1176 (overturning the appellate court’s decision to 
uphold termination of the biological father’s parental rights); In re Baby Girl B., 261 P.3d 558, 560 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that the trial court misinterpreted the statutory grounds to 
terminate a father’s parental rights). 
 7.  Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act, ch. 145, 1990 Kan. Sess. Laws 886 (codified as 
amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2111 to -2143 (2005 & Supp. 2012)). 
 8.  1 LINDA D. ELROD & JAMES P. BUCHELE, KANSAS FAMILY LAW § 6.1, at 310 (1999). 
 9.  See, e.g., In re D.D.H., 184 P.3d 967, 971 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (citing In re K.J.B., 259 
P.2d 853, 861 (Kan. 1998)). 
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Kansas Statutes and the amendments thereto.  Part II.C details the facts 
and procedural history of the recent In re Baby Girl P. case decided by 
the Kansas Supreme Court, and Part II.D examines prior Kansas 
appellate decisions regarding the termination of parental rights in 
pending adoptions.  Part II.E discusses the Kansas Legislature’s recent 
attempt to amend section 59-2136 in response to the Baby Girl P. 
decision, and Part II.F examines the constitutional rights of both children 
and biological parents and the effect of those rights in adoption 
proceedings.  Part III then addresses the effect of Baby Girl P. on future 
adoptions in Kansas and the detrimental effect of uncertainty in 
adoptions.  Part III also proposes solutions to resolve the unpredictability 
that may arise in custody disputes surrounding a pending adoption. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Adoption Controversy in Recent History 
Adoption is defined as a “means of creating a legal relationship of 
parent and child between persons who were not so related by nature or 
law.”10  Procedurally, adoption severs the legal relationship between 
birth parents and children and “change[s] the status of the child in 
relation to its adoptive parents,” creating a new parent–child 
relationship.11  Generally, the consent of the biological parents is 
required for an adoption to be valid, absent statutory circumstances 
making consent unnecessary.12 
Recent statistics from the Department of Health and Human Services 
state that “approximately 136,000 children were adopted annually in the 
United States” in 2007 and 2008.13  While a large percentage of these 
adoptions resulted in the successful formation of a new parent–child 
relationship, some statistics suggest that disruption and dissolution rates 
can range from as high as twenty percent, to as low as less than one-tenth 
of one percent.14  Although rare, cases of infant adoption disruption, 
specifically involving the rights of biological parents, have caused 
                                                          
 10.  2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 1 (2003). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. § 55. 
 13.  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HOW MANY CHILDREN 
WERE ADOPTED IN 2007 AND 2008?, at 4 (2011), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/ 
adopted0708.cfm. 
 14.  Jeanette Mills, Comment, Unwed Birthfathers and Infant Adoption: Balancing a Father’s 
Rights with the States Need for a Timely Surrender Process, 62 LA. L. REV. 615, 615 (2002). 
1126 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
controversy for decades.  In the early 1990s, the Baby Jessica case15 
gripped the nation and brought to light the doubt and uncertainty that can 
surround adoption.  Baby Jessica was born to a single mother in Iowa 
and given up for adoption to a Michigan couple shortly after her birth.16  
Within two weeks of the custody grant, the biological mother moved to 
revoke her relinquishment, stating she had lied about the identity of the 
biological father.17  The biological father also asserted his rights, and 
after a year of litigation, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decisions to revoke the relinquishment and send Baby Jessica 
back to her biological parents.18  The Iowa Supreme Court also rejected 
the adoptive parents’ assertion that a best interests analysis governed the 
issue of termination in an adoption case.19  Although the adoptive 
parents’ custodial rights were terminated, they petitioned a Michigan 
court to modify the Iowa order.20  The Michigan Supreme Court 
ultimately held Michigan did not have jurisdiction over the adoption21 
and that Baby Jessica’s interest in family life was not independent of her 
biological parents’ interest in raising her,22 absent a finding of parental 
unfitness.23 
The custodial struggle for Baby Jessica made national news and 
pitted the biological parents against the prospective adoptive parents with 
whom Baby Jessica had lived for two-and-a-half years.24  The case 
ignited a national debate about the best interests of the child after the 
nation watched Baby Jessica sob as she was removed from the only 
parents she had known to be returned to her biological parents in Iowa, 
who were strangers to her.25  National polls indicated most Americans 
supported the adoptive parents, and commentators warned of the 
potentially lingering damage the separation would cause Baby Jessica.26  
Numerous law review articles published soon after the decision analyzed 
the state of the law and called for courts and legislatures to reevaluate 
                                                          
 15.  In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (per curiam). 
 16.  Id. at 652. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 652–53. 
 19.  Id. at 653. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 659. 
 22.  Id. at 665. 
 23.  Id. at 666. 
 24.  See Michele Ingrassia & Karen Springen, She’s Not Baby Jessica Anymore, NEWSWEEK, 
Mar. 21, 1994, at 60, 60, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/1994/03/21/ 
she-s-not-baby-jessica-anymore.html. 
 25.  Id.   
 26.  See id. 
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adoption laws and procedures to prevent future Baby Jessica 
catastrophes.27  Ten years after Baby Jessica, however, Kansas courts are 
still struggling to define a consistent standard to prevent traumatic 
removals of children who have been in the custody of adoptive parents 
for an extended period of time. 
B. Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act 
Kansas adoptions are governed by KARA, which was passed in 1990 
to consolidate existing adoption and relinquishment statutes in Kansas.28  
The Kansas Judicial Council’s Family Law Advisory Committee 
primarily drafted KARA after the Kansas Senate attempted to change 
and recodify the Kansas adoption statutes in 1987.29  The committee 
hoped to achieve “greater clarity” in application of the adoption 
statutes.30 
1. Section 59-2136 
Section 59-2136 of KARA applies when “relinquishment or consent 
to an adoption has not been obtained from a [biological] parent.”31  The 
provisions of section 59-2136 set standards for when termination of 
parental rights is acceptable in both stepparent and non-stepparent 
adoptions.32  In non-stepparent adoptions, if a birth mother consents to 
the adoption of her child, a petition is filed to terminate parental rights of 
the father.33  Notice of the adoption proceeding must then be “given to 
every person identified as the father or a possible father,”34 and if a father 
                                                          
 27.  See, e.g., Lynn Kirsch, Note, Unwed Fathers and Their Newborn Children Placed for 
Adoption: Protecting the Rights of Both in Custody Disputes, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1011, 1026–29 
(1994) (proposing a two-tiered approach that “considers the biological father’s fitness to be a 
custodial parent, and then considers any detriment that might occur if the child is placed with the 
biological father”); Carrie L. Wambaugh, Comment, Biology Is Important, but Does Not Necessarily 
Always Constitute a “Family”: A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 AKRON L. REV. 791, 
831–32 (1999) (recommending the Uniform Adoption Act as a solution to prevent more “tragic 
stories” in adoption). 
 28.  See FAMILY LAW ADVISORY COMMITTEE, KAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, COMMENTS TO 1990 
ADOPTION AND RELINQUISHMENT ACT 1 (1990), http://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/Documents/ 
Studies%20and%20Reports/Previous%20Judicial%20Council%20Studies/PDF/1990_Adoption_%2
0Relinquishment_Comments.pdf. 
 29.  See id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(a) (Supp. 2012).   
 32.  See id. § 59-2136(d)–(e). 
 33.  Id. § 59-2136(e). 
 34.  Id. § 59-2136(f). 
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cannot be identified, the court must terminate the unknown father’s 
parental rights.35  If a father is identified and asserts his parental rights, 
the court must determine parentage and then may terminate his rights by 
clear and convincing evidence of any of the following: 
(A) The father abandoned or neglected the child after having 
knowledge of the child’s birth; 
(B) the father is unfit as a parent or incapable of giving consent; 
(C) the father has made no reasonable efforts to support or 
communicate with the child after having knowledge of the child’s birth; 
(D) the father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without 
reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during the six 
months prior to the child’s birth; 
(E) the father abandoned the mother after having knowledge of the 
pregnancy; 
(F) the birth of the child was the result of rape of the mother; or 
(G) the father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for 
two consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition.36 
In determining whether the father’s parental rights should be terminated, 
the court may “disregard incidental visitations, contacts, communications 
or contributions.”37 
2. The Parental Preference Doctrine 
Before KARA, the Kansas Supreme Court applied the parental 
preference doctrine to determine whether to terminate parental rights in 
an adoption proceeding.38  In Sheppard v. Sheppard, the Kansas Supreme 
Court,  reviewing a lower court’s adjudication of a custody dispute 
between a child’s mother and grandparents, reversed the lower court’s 
decision that it was in the best interest of the child to remain with his 
maternal grandparents.39  Employing the Due Process Clause of the 
                                                          
 35.  Id. § 59-2136(g). 
 36.  Id. § 59-2136(h)(1). 
 37.  Id. § 59-2136(h)(2)(B). 
 38.  See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121, 1123–25 (Kan. 1981) (discussing the history 
and reasoning behind the parental preference doctrine). 
 39.  Id. at 1128. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, the court determined the mother had a 
fundamental, constitutional  right to the “care, custody and control of . . . 
her child, and that the right of such a parent to custody of the child 
cannot be taken away in favor of a third person, absent a finding of 
unfitness on the part of the parent.”40  Further, the mother could not be 
denied her parental rights solely because a court determined someone 
else could better raise the child.41  The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed 
the parental preference doctrine in In re Guardianship of Williams when 
it declined to apply solely a test based on the best interest of the child in 
a custody dispute between a biological parent and third-party 
nonparent.42 
After KARA, however, the Kansas Court of Appeals declined to 
apply the parental preference doctrine when deciding whether to 
terminate parental rights in an adoption proceeding.43  In In re Baby Boy 
N., the court found that section 59-2136(h) incorporated the parental 
preference doctrine by requiring a showing of “clear and convincing” 
evidence of at least one of the seven grounds for termination before a 
court may terminate a biological parent’s rights.44  According to the 
court, section 59-2136(h) sufficiently protects the biological parent’s due 
process rights.45  In adoption cases where the biological parent’s rights 
are at issue, section 59-2136(h) prevails over the parental preference 
doctrine because the doctrine is “nothing more than a rule of law 
designed to protect the constitutional due process rights of a natural 
parent to the custody of his or her children.”46  The court found that the 
“protections incorporated within [section 59-2136(h)] provide the same, 
if not better, protection of a parent’s constitutional rights.”47 
                                                          
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at 1127. 
 42.  869 P.2d 661, 670 (Kan. 1994) (“[A]bsent highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances 
the parental preference doctrine is to be applied in a custody dispute over minor children when the 
dispute is between a natural parent who has not been found unfit and a nonparent.  Likewise . . . the 
best interests of the child is the appropriate standard to be applied in custody disputes between 
parents.”). 
 43.  See In re Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d 680, 688 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that the 
parental preference doctrine is preempted by statute). 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
1130 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
3. Amendments to Section 59-2136 
Due to the sensitive nature of section 59-2136 cases and the 
complexity inherent in the termination of parental rights, the statute has 
evolved since its enactment in 1990.  In 2006, the legislature amended 
the statute to allow a court to consider the best interests of the child when 
determining whether parental rights should be terminated.48  However, 
Kansas courts have put little force behind this amendment since its 
passage in 2006.  While the statute permits courts to consider the best 
interests of the child, courts have interpreted it with the understanding 
that the Kansas Legislature did not intend that the best interests 
considerations ever be the sole grounds for terminating parental rights.49  
Instead, courts have construed the statute to permit consideration of the 
child’s best interests only after the court has found at least one 
circumstance listed in section 59-2136(h)(1).50  Further, “the best 
interests consideration merely ‘provides the court with additional 
discretionary powers to consider the best interests of the child in denying 
the adoption—even where a natural parent has not assumed the duties of 
a parent as articulated by this court—for unique reasons.’”51  While a 
court may decide that termination may be in the best interest of the child, 
it must refuse to terminate parental rights absent clear and convincing 
evidence of any of the factors listed in section 59-2136(h)(1).52  The 
Kansas Court of Appeals utilized the best interests test when it affirmed a 
stepparent adoption in 2012 in In re C.A.T.53  The court found the 
biological father had met several of the statutory grounds for 
termination54 and further that the termination of his rights was in the best 
interest of the children because the stepfather had “stable employment, 
had a good relationship with the children for several years, and that [the 
biological father] had not been fulfilling the duties of a parent.”55 
 
                                                          
 48.  Act of Mar. 20, 2006, ch. 22, sec. 1, § 59-2136(h)(2)(A), 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 53.  In its 
current state, the statute reads: “In making a finding whether parental rights shall be terminated 
under this subsection, the court may: (A) Consider and weigh the best interest of the child.” KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(2)(A) (Supp. 2012). 
 49.  See, e.g., In re Baby Boy M., 193 P.3d 520, 528 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
 50.  See, e.g., id.  
 51.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re G.L.V., 190 P.3d 245, 265 (Kan. 2008)). 
 52.  See id. at 527 (stating that “the district court failed to make any of the requisite findings to 
support a termination of . . . parental rights, except an apparent finding as to the best interests of the 
child,” which was insufficient). 
 53.  273 P.3d 813, 821 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). 
 54.   Id. at 815–16. 
 55.  Id. at 821.  
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C. In re Baby Girl P. 
 
Cases regarding the termination of parental rights under section 59-
2136 often require courts to make difficult legal decisions while 
simultaneously detaching from the highly charged emotions that 
accompany such situations.  A 2010 Kansas Supreme Court case, In re 
Baby Girl P.,56 was one such case.  Baby Girl P. was born in June 2008.57  
Her biological mother placed her for adoption shortly after birth and 
selected an adoptive couple, who filed a petition for adoption a few 
weeks later.58  Baby Girl P. was conceived during her biological 
mother’s extramarital affair.59  After discovering she was pregnant, the 
biological mother notified the biological father.60  There was conflicting 
testimony at trial as to the biological father’s interest in and excitement 
about the news; however, testimony showed that the biological mother 
told the biological father via text message that she had suffered a 
miscarriage and did not want him to contact her anymore.61  The 
biological father claimed he had no reason to question the truth of the 
biological mother’s text message, which was corroborated by a friend of 
the biological mother who claimed she thought the biological mother was 
“no longer pregnant.”62  For six months prior to the birth of Baby Girl P., 
the biological father did not provide any emotional or financial support 
to the biological mother.63 
After Baby Girl P. was born and taken into her prospective adoptive 
parents’ custody, the biological father learned of the adoption proceeding 
and obtained counsel to protect his parental rights.64  An evidentiary 
hearing regarding the parental right issue was held nearly six months 
after Baby Girl P.’s birth.65  In the period between the biological father 
learning of Baby Girl P.’s birth and the evidentiary hearing regarding his 
parental rights, the biological father visited the child only twice, wrote 
one letter to the prospective adoptive parents offering his support, and 
delivered Christmas presents to the adoption agency to be sent to Baby 
                                                          
 56.  242 P.3d 1168 (Kan. 2010). 
 57.  Id. at 1170. 
 58.  See id. at 1171. 
 59.  See id. at 1170. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 1171. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  Id. 
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Girl P.66  These gifts included a “handmade quilt, three or four shirts, and 
two baby bibs.”67  After the evidentiary hearing, the district court 
terminated the biological father’s parental rights, finding: “(1) that he 
had failed to support the child after learning of her birth, and (2) that the 
child’s best interests would be served by terminating [the biological 
father’s] parental rights.”68  In support of its findings, the district court 
noted that the biological father had “not ‘provided or offered financial 
support’ for the child even though he had a job” with an annual salary of 
$25,000.69  Further, he did not file a separate paternity lawsuit,70 which 
could have mandated parenting time with the child and established an 
order of financial support.71  The district court then weighed the best 
interests of the child pursuant to section 59-2136(h)(2) and concluded 
“[t]he best interest of [the child] tips the evidentiary scale for this court 
in concluding that [the biological father’s] parental rights . . . should be 
terminated.”72 
The biological father appealed more than a year later, and the Kansas 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to terminate his 
parental rights, stating that “the district court’s factual findings regarding 
a failure to provide financial support and the child’s best interests were 
supported by substantial evidence and by Kansas case law, especially the 
A.A.T., M.R.C., M.D.K., and Baby W. cases.”73 
The Kansas Supreme Court granted the biological father’s petition 
for review and reversed the decision of the Kansas Court of Appeals,74 
essentially overruling years of Kansas adoption precedent.  The court 
determined that the prospective adoptive parents had failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the biological father had failed to 
support Baby Girl P., finding instead that his behavior demonstrated a 
                                                          
 66.  Id. 
 67.  In re Baby Girl P., No. 1022,287, 2010 WL 348291, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 22), rev’d, 
242 P.3d 1168 (Kan. 2010). 
 68.  Id. at *2. 
 69.  Id. at *1. 
 70.  Id.   
 71.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2204(b) (Supp. 2012) (providing that the rights and responsibilities 
of acknowledgement of paternity include, among other things, providing support for the child and 
custody and parenting time). 
 72.  Baby Girl P., 2010 WL 348291, at *1 (first, second, and fourth alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73.  See id. at *5 (noting In re A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180 (Kan. 2008); In re M.R.C., 217 P.3d 50 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2009); In re M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); In re Baby W., 210 P.3d 687 
(Kan. Ct. App. July 10, 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision)). 
 74.  In re Baby Girl P., 242 P.3d 1168, 1172, 1176 (Kan. 2010). 
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desire to maintain a relationship with his child.75  Notably, the court 
emphasized that the state had a strong interest in preserving biological 
parental rights,76 stating that “the law presumes that the father starts out 
with a parental relationship; it is his to abandon, not to conquer.”77 
D. Kansas Case Law Prior to In re Baby Girl P. 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in In re Baby Girl P. 
disregarded years of precedent set by Kansas appellate courts regarding 
the termination of parental rights.  In 2002, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
upheld the termination of a father’s rights in In re M.D.K.78  In M.D.K., 
the biological father knew of the pregnancy but failed to support the 
mother for six months prior to the child’s birth.79  The evidence showed 
that although the father worked full-time for part of the six months and 
lived rent-free with his parents, he did not contribute any of his wages to 
the child’s mother.80  His parents bought the biological mother’s car from 
her to alleviate her financial difficulties, and his mother and grandmother 
made a quilt for the baby and delivered it along with some baby clothes 
to the biological mother.81  Further, the biological mother told the birth 
father to stop calling her, and the biological father asserted that the 
biological mother “made no requests for money and, instead, told him 
everything was going well and that she did not need anything.”82  The 
Kansas Court of Appeals found that “the term ‘support’ does not include 
a requirement that ‘the father provide total support for the mother . . . 
[but] support that is incidental or inconsequential in nature is not 
sufficient.”83  For support to be sufficient, it “must be of some 
consequence and reasonable under all of the circumstances.”84  The court 
also found that support must include the “natural and moral duty of a 
parent to show affection, care and interest toward his or her child”85 and 
                                                          
 75.  See id.  
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 1175. 
 78.  58 P.3d 745, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 79.  See id. at 748. 
 80.  Id. at 748–49. 
 81.  Id. at 747–48. 
 82.  Id. at 747. 
 83.  Id. at 748 (quoting In re Baby Girl S., 29 P.3d 466, 468 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 84.  Id. (quoting Baby Girl S., 29 P.3d at 468) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85.  Id. (quoting In re B.M.W., 2 P.3d 159, 161 (Kan. 2000)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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“mere general offers of support are not sufficient.”86  While the father 
argued that he was prevented from providing support by the mother’s 
actions, the court noted that a father must pursue “the opportunities and 
options which were available to carry out his duties to the best of his 
ability.”87  And while a mother’s refusal of assistance is one factor in 
considering whether the father adequately provided support to the 
mother,88 “a mother’s failure to act upon a general offer of assistance by 
not contacting the father and telling him what she specifically need[s] 
does not amount to interference or a refusal of financial help.”89  The 
court noted that termination is appropriate if a father makes only general 
offers of support and that he must “act affirmatively during the mother’s 
pregnancy to protect his rights to the child.”90 
Notably, Judge Beier wrote separately in a concurring opinion to 
emphasize that putative fathers must be aware of the implications of the 
court’s decision: 
 An unwed man who learns that his unwed sexual partner is pregnant 
and intends to carry the pregnancy to term has only one way to ensure 
he can exercise his parental rights after the birth, regardless of whether 
the mother intends to exercise hers: He must relinquish possession and 
control of a part of his property or income to the mother-to-be during 
the last 6 months of the pregnancy so that she may use the items or 
money to support herself or prepare for the arrival of the child.  He 
must do this regardless of whether his relationship with the mother-to-
be continues or ends.  He must do this regardless of whether the 
mother-to-be is willing to have any type of contact with him 
whatsoever or to submit to his emotional or physical control in any 
way.  The birth may be the event that triggers a legal obligation of 
support, but it marks the end of the period when voluntary support can 
preserve the father-to-be’s right to raise his child.91 
Judge Beier suggested that “[e]ven in the most acrimonious of 
situations, a father-to-be can fund a bank account” for the mother or 
“have property or money delivered to the [mother] by a neutral third 
                                                          
 86.  Id. (citing Baby Girl S., 29 P.3d at 469). 
 87.  Id. at 749 (quoting In re Baby Boy W., 891 P.2d 457, 461 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 88.  Id. (citing Baby Girl S., 29 P.3d at 469). 
 89.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Baby Boy W., 891 P.2d at 461) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 90.  Id. (quoting Baby Girl S., 29 P.3d at 468). 
 91.  Id. at 750 (Beier, J., concurring). 
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party . . . and must . . . be as creative as necessary” to provide assistance 
to the mother regardless of her hostility or lack of interest in him.92 
Relying on precedent from In re M.D.K., the Kansas Court of 
Appeals also upheld the termination of a biological father’s rights in In 
re M.R.C.93  Similar to the facts in Baby Girl P.,94 M.R.C.’s biological 
mother misled M.R.C.’s biological father by saying she had miscarried.95  
The court found that passively accepting the rumor that the biological 
mother had miscarried was not a defense to failing to provide support 
because “a father has a duty to take affirmative action to manifest a full 
commitment to parenting responsibilities.”96  The court additionally 
required the father to “exercise reasonable diligence to discover whether 
the mother has lied to him concerning the existence of the child.”97 
Further building on this trend, the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld 
termination of the rights of a father in In re Baby W.98 because he failed 
to make “reasonable efforts to support or communicate with Baby W. 
after learning of the child’s birth.”99  Despite legitimately believing she 
had miscarried, the mother gave birth to Baby W. and made 
arrangements for the child to be adopted shortly after.100  When the 
biological father was located, he filed an acknowledgement of paternity, 
stating he was “ready and willing” to receive residential custody of the 
baby as soon as possible.101  The district court terminated the father’s 
rights because after learning of his child, the “father had ‘made no 
reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child.’”102  On 
appeal, the biological father argued that “he did everything asked of him 
to retain his parental rights,” but it was unreasonable for him to visit the 
child in Kansas because he lived in Virginia.103  At an earlier hearing, he 
admitted that he had provided no support for the child, but then stated he 
had “‘every intention’ of reimbursing the adoptive parents” for their care 
of Baby W.104  The court upheld termination of his parental rights 
                                                          
 92.  Id. at 751. 
 93.  217 P.3d 50, 56 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009). 
 94.  See supra Part II.C. 
 95.  In re M.R.C., 217 P.3d at 51. 
 96.  See id. at 55–56. 
 97.  Id. at 56. 
 98.  210 P.3d 687 (Kan. Ct. App. July 10, 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision). 
 99.  Id. at *7. 
 100.  Id. at *1. 
 101.  Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104.  Id. 
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because “it is insufficient for a father to merely stand ready, and the 
father should have taken affirmative action to provide support for Baby 
W. upon learning of the child’s birth rather than waiting to see what the 
court might eventually order.”105 
In a comprehensive analysis of putative fathers’ rights, the Kansas 
Supreme Court upheld the termination of a biological father’s parental 
rights in In re A.A.T. after his rights were terminated without his 
knowledge.106  The biological mother and father had a short relationship 
and conceived A.A.T.107  The biological mother informed the father she 
was pregnant before she moved from New York to Wichita but later told 
him she had undergone an abortion.108  The biological father continued to 
ask the mother about her pregnancy and was skeptical she had actually 
had gone through with the abortion.109  For a period of time spanning 
immediately before and immediately after A.A.T.’s birth, the biological 
father and mother continued communicating via telephone, and the 
biological father persistently expressed his doubts regarding the mother’s 
truthfulness about the termination of her pregnancy.110  He made 
statements such as, “I know I have a child, I can feel it” and predicted to 
a friend that the child was a daughter.111  He even purchased earrings as a 
Christmas gift for the child he thought he had.112  After A.A.T.’s birth, 
the biological mother continued to lie, telling her family members and 
friends the baby died at birth and deceiving the adoption agency 
regarding the identity of the biological father and his whereabouts.113  
She also lied during the adoption proceeding and at an interview with a 
guardian ad litem, claiming she had not had contact with the biological 
father since her second month of pregnancy and giving a false surname 
for him on an affidavit.114  In the absence of any reliable information 
about the real biological father, a notice was placed in the New York Post 
regarding the birth of A.A.T.115  After no father appeared, the court 
terminated parental rights and finalized the adoption decree for A.A.T.116 
                                                          
 105.  Id. at *6. 
 106.  196 P.3d 1180, 1184–85 (Kan. 2008). 
 107.  See id. at 1185. 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 1186. 
 116.  Id. 
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When A.A.T. was six months old, her biological mother finally told 
the biological father the truth about A.A.T.’s birth, and within six weeks 
the biological father retained counsel to set aside the adoption 
proceeding.117  After a DNA test confirmed the biological father’s 
paternity, he sought to set aside the adoption and requested visitation 
rights with A.A.T.118  The district court refused to set aside the adoption 
decree and ruled that because the father suspected the mother was still 
pregnant, he should have taken affirmative action to determine the 
truth.119 
After a lengthy analysis of the history of putative fathers’ rights, the 
Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed the district court’s decision to 
terminate.  The court synthesized the holdings from putative father cases 
from the United States Supreme Court and newborn adoption cases 
across the country and found the emergence of two common factors.120 
[A] putative father has a liberty interest affording a right to notice of 
proceedings to adopt his newborn child if he: (1) diligently took 
affirmative action that manifested a full commitment to parenting 
responsibilities and (2) did so during the pregnancy and within a short 
time after he discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the 
biological mother was pregnant with his child.121 
The court found the first factor could be proven by “measur[ing] the 
putative father’s efforts to make a financial commitment to the . . . child” 
and by the father “legally substantiat[ing] his relationship with the child” 
in addition to providing support, including emotional and financial, to the 
mother during her pregnancy.122  The second factor required the father 
“to make a commitment to parenting . . . in a prompt and timely manner 
as measured by the fleeting opportunity availed to the father under the 
circumstances of the case.”123  Applying these factors, the Kansas 
Supreme Court concluded that A.A.T.’s biological father was not diligent 
in taking “affirmative action that manifested a full commitment to 
parenting responsibilities during the pregnancy and within a short time 
after.”124 
                                                          
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See id. at 1189–94. 
 121.  Id. at 1194. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id. at 1195. 
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E. Kansas House Bill No. 2482 
After the Kansas Supreme Court decided Baby Girl P. in October 
2010, the Kansas Legislature introduced Kansas House Bill 2482 by the 
Committee on Judiciary on January 19, 2012.125  The bill was drafted in 
response to the outcome of Baby Girl P. and a subsequent decision by 
the Kansas Court of Appeals, Baby Girl B.,126 which implemented the 
new standards the Kansas Supreme Court applied in Baby Girl P.127  
Although the bill died in committee, it proposed some essential 
amendments to KARA, including provisions clarifying the standards for 
parental termination in section 59-2136.128  These amendments added 
language requiring the court to consider the “totality of circumstances” 
when determining whether parental rights should be terminated.129  
Another provision clarified what constitutes “support” for purposes of 
section 59-2136(h)(1).130  Also worth noting was the addition of the 
phrase “possible pregnancy” within the statute, which would require the 
father to provide support for the mother six months prior to the child’s 
birth upon having knowledge of a pregnancy or “possible pregnancy.”131 
The bill was tabled until May 1, 2012 during a February 16, 2012 
meeting of the House Judiciary Committee,132 and it was never addressed 
again.  While the bill garnered some support during the committee 
meeting, some outspoken critics of the bill—described as a “bad bill 
done with the best intentions”—displayed concern with the “totality of 
circumstances” addition, fearing it could overrule the “prime directive” 
in Kansas that biological parents raise their children.133  The concern 
over the addition of the “totality of circumstances” analysis likely caused 
the bill to die in committee, illustrated by one committee member’s 
comment that “[w]e should leave the decision with the judges who know 
the facts and issues of the case.”134 
                                                          
 125.  H.B. 2482, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012). 
 126.  261 P.3d 558 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
 127.  See Letter from Austin K. Vincent et al. to Kansas House Judiciary Committee (January 31, 
2012), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2012/b2011_12/committees/misc/ctte_h_jud_1_ 
20120131_03_other.pdf (expressing support for HB 2482 and listing how the amendments address 
issues raised in recent case law). 
 128.  See H.B. 2482.  
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See id.  
 131.  See id. 
 132.  KAN. H.R JUDICIARY COMM., MINUTES OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, FEB. 16, 
2012, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 11 (2012). 
 133.  Id. at 9–10. 
 134.  Id. at 10. 
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F. The Constitutional Rights of Children and Putative Fathers 
It has long been recognized that children have protected rights under 
the United States Constitution.135  Although there was a time when the 
law treated children’s best interests as synonymous with their parents’, 
children’s rights have slowly begun to earn recognition as independent of 
their parents.136  A shift in the way the law regards children has allowed 
more focus on the independent rights of children who are “the subject of 
state intervention, both against their parents and against the state when it 
assumes the parenting responsibility.”137  Because children are 
considered independent individuals under the Constitution, when the 
state “threatens to take away their liberties or otherwise affect their 
interests adversely, they are entitled to the protective procedures of the 
Bill of Rights.”138 
The Supreme Court has found that the Due Process Clause requires 
that a school give a student notice of the charges against her and a chance 
to respond to them;139 that it mandates a juvenile delinquent have notice, 
counsel, and the right to confront witnesses against her;140 and that 
juvenile delinquency proceedings require proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.141  The Supreme Court has also found that children 
have individual constitutional rights concerning procreation decisions142 
and First Amendment speech rights.143  It is only appropriate based on 
the variety of other rights granted to children under the Constitution, that 
before a child is removed from the custody of the only parent she has 
                                                          
 135.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional 
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of 
majority.”). 
 136.  See Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1, 3–4 
(Harvard Educ. Review 1974) (describing the change in attitudes towards children’s rights from the 
eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century). 
 137.  Id. at 5. 
 138.  Id. at 23 (quoting Justice Black, “Undoubtedly this (entitlement to Constitutional 
guarantees) would be true of an adult defendant, and it would be a plain denial of equal protection of 
the law—an invidious discrimination—to hold that others subject to heavier punishments could, 
because they are children, be denied these same constitutional safeguards.”). 
 139.  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (“[S]tudents facing suspension and the 
consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and 
afforded some kind of hearing.”). 
 140.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 56 (1967). 
 141.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 142.  See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977); Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).   
 143.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“[S]tudents 
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.”). 
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ever known, whether it is her biological or adoptive parent, she should 
also be entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause. 
While biological parents have a fundamental liberty interest in 
raising their children, “the mere existence of a biological link” does not 
automatically require protection of these rights.144  In Lehr v. Robertson, 
the United States Supreme Court put limits on the extent of a biological 
father’s fundamental rights when it held that when a putative father 
participates in the rearing of his child, his interest acquires protection 
under the Due Process Clause, but “the mere existence of a biological 
link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.”145  Further, the 
Court noted that while the importance of the family does originate with 
the blood relationship, it also “stems from the emotional attachments that 
derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays 
in ‘promot[ing] a way of life.’”146  Notably, the Court recognized that the 
Constitution does not automatically protect that right if a biological 
father fails to take responsibility for that child, although it is significant 
that the father’s biological connection affords him a unique opportunity 
to bond with his child.147 
Courts and legislatures must consider these constitutional rights and 
interests when determining legal standards for adoption, particularly in 
the context of terminating parental rights. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In re Baby Girl P. and ambiguity in section 59-2136 have created 
uncertainty in Kansas adoption law.  The Kansas Supreme Court’s 
reversal of the Kansas Court of Appeals decision in Baby Girl P. creates 
confusion going forward, specifically regarding what minimum level of 
support a biological father must show to retain parental rights.  Baby Girl 
P. also adds an additional level of uncertainty regarding how courts 
should apply the parental preference doctrine.  Kansas precedent 
determined that the parental preference doctrine was incorporated in 
section 59-2136, but also interpreted section 59-2136 to require the 
biological father demonstrate minimum levels of support to avoid 
termination.148  However, the traditional use of the doctrine, independent 
                                                          
 144.  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). 
 145.  See id. 
 146.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 
431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)). 
 147.  Id. at 262. 
 148.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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of section 59-2136, was resurrected in Baby Girl P., when the court ruled 
that biological parent rights must be preserved absent a showing of 
unfitness,149 a decision that contradicted years of Kansas case law. 
Where counsel for biological fathers and prospective adoptive 
parents once had a more definite understanding of what was required of 
biological fathers to retain their parental rights, the recent decisions have 
caused confusion about the Kansas appellate courts’ stance now and in 
the future.  The Kansas Legislature must amend KARA to clarify this 
ambiguity and eliminate future unpredictability.  The statute should 
clearly specify the requirements biological fathers must meet to preserve 
their parental rights, particularly in regards to what is meant by the word 
“support” in sections 59-2136(h)(1)(C) and (D).  While it is imperative 
that courts protect the biological parents’ fundamental rights in raising 
their children, they should also recognize that children have 
constitutional due process rights and an interest in quick resolution of 
their custodial status.150  Extended periods of time without custody 
resolution can be detrimental in a young child’s development.151  
Therefore, while balancing the due process rights of both the parent and 
child, the Kansas Legislature must also implement new procedures to 
expedite parental termination proceedings. 
A. Effect of the Kansas Supreme Court’s Decision in In re Baby Girl P. 
1. Reversal of Prior Case Law 
The facts surrounding Baby Girl P. were analogous to those in 
M.D.K., M.R.C., Baby W., and A.A.T.; however, the outcomes in those 
cases were far different.  First, the courts in M.D.K., M.R.C., Baby W., 
and A.A.T. all found “general” offers of support to be insufficient and 
instead required the father to take affirmative action to retain parental 
rights.152  Although the father in Baby W. challenged the pending 
adoption and informed the district court he was “ready and willing” and 
wanted custody of the child as soon as possible,153 the Court of Appeals 
found his “legal efforts [could not] make up for the evidence that he 
made no reasonable effort to actually support or communicate with the 
                                                          
 149.  See supra Part II.C. 
 150.  See supra Part II.F. 
 151.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 152.  See supra Part II.D. 
 153.  In re Baby W., 210 P.3d 687, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. July 10, 2009) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision). 
1142 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
child after learning of [the child’s] birth.”154  The Kansas Supreme Court 
found that although the biological father in A.A.T. asserted that the 
biological mother knew he would have done anything she requested to 
support her during her pregnancy, “standing ready and being willing to 
provide support is insufficient,” and “affirmative action must be 
taken.”155  The biological father in Baby Girl P. did not take affirmative 
action but rather provided a “general offer of support” when he wrote to 
the adoptive parents merely stating, “If ever, at any given point and time, 
if you need something, anything at all I am here for her.  So just let me 
know, [it’s] not a problem whatsoever.  [It’s] my responsibility & duty 
and I am ready for that,” without actually providing any support for the 
child.156  The Supreme Court, however, found this offer of support to be 
evidence of the father asserting his desire to care for and communicate 
with the child.157 
Additionally, the Kansas Supreme Court altered its interpretation of 
“incidental visitations, contacts, communications, or contributions” from 
section 59-2136(h)(2)(B) in Baby Girl P.  In M.D.K., the court found 
blankets and a picture frame that were delivered to the child along with 
the paternal grandparents’ purchase of the birth mother’s car for fair 
market value did not rise to the level of statutory support.158  In Baby 
Girl P., the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision 
to terminate Baby Girl P.’s father’s rights, finding the quilt, clothing, and 
baby bibs he provided her to be inconsequential or incidental.159  In 
contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court found Baby Girl P.’s father’s gifts to 
be “actions of a father who is attempting to maintain a relationship with 
his child, not the actions of a father who is neglecting his child,”160 and 
determined that although “the statute allows courts to disregard 
‘incidental’ parental activities, [the birth father’s] efforts were clearly 
more than incidental.”161  The court found that his conduct went beyond 
                                                          
 154.  Id. at *6. 
 155.  In re A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1195 (Kan. 2008). 
 156.  See In re Baby Girl P., No. 102,287, 2010 WL 348291, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 22) 
(alterations in original), rev’d, 242 P.3d 1168 (Kan. 2010). 
 157.  See In re Baby Girl P., 242 P.3d 1168, 1176 (Kan. 2010). 
 158.  In re M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 748−49 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 159.  See Baby Girl P., 2010 WL 348291, at *2. 
 160.  Baby Girl P., 242 P.3d at 1175. 
 161.  Id. 
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the definition of incidental162 and was more than “scarcely casual or 
insignificant.”163 
Evidence in Baby Girl P. that the father “retained counsel, . . . filed 
court actions to obtain visitation, . . . gave gifts, and . . . offered to give 
anything that was needed for his daughter’s support,” demonstrated to 
the court a “commitment to assuming the role of a father.”164  However, 
the support displayed by the father in Baby Girl P. is less than or at most 
equivalent to that which the birth fathers displayed in M.D.K., M.R.C., 
Baby W., and A.A.T.  The evidence of support the court found when 
deciding to maintain the father’s rights in Baby Girl P. was insufficient 
for the biological fathers in prior cases.  For example, upon notification 
of his paternity, Baby W.’s father asserted his rights and challenged the 
adoption.165  He informed the court he was “ready and willing” to take 
custody of the child and went so far as filing an acknowledgement of 
paternity,166 an action Baby Girl P.’s father did not pursue.  The court 
terminated Baby W’s father’s rights because he did not voluntarily offer 
any support despite testifying he would reimburse the adoptive parents at 
a later date.167  The father in M.D.K. asked his parents for help 
supporting M.D.K.’s mother and they in return bought M.D.K.’s 
mother’s car from her “in hopes of alleviating her financial 
difficulties.”168  The father also delivered a quilt and some baby clothes 
to the birth mother and sent at least two payments to her after the birth of 
the child.169  The record from A.A.T. revealed that the biological father 
provided “$200 for airfare and ‘$20 here, $20 there;’” however, the court 
found this to be “insignificant.”170  The father in Baby Girl P. provided 
no financial support to his child or the adoptive parents beyond the 
delivery of a few small Christmas gifts.171 
The cases also differ in how the courts handled the birth mother’s 
deception of the father during the pregnancy or her refusal to contact the 
father before or after birth.  In A.A.T., the biological mother lied to the 
                                                          
 162.  The court defined “incidental” as “casual, of minor importance, insignificant, and of little 
consequence.”  Id. (quoting In re McMullen, 691 P.2d 17, 18 (Kan. 1984)). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See In re Baby W., 210 P.3d 687, at *1−2 (Kan. Ct. App. July 10, 2009) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 166.  Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167.  See id. at *4. 
 168.  See In re M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 747–48 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 169.  Id. at 748. 
 170.  In re A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1195 (Kan. 2008). 
 171.  See In re Baby Girl P., 242 P.3d 1168, 1175 (Kan. 2010). 
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biological father when she told him she had an abortion.172  She further 
misled a guardian ad litem involved with the case when she provided an 
incorrect surname for the biological father and asserted she had not had 
contact with him since the second month of her pregnancy.173  This 
deception caused the court to terminate the father’s rights even though he 
was unaware of the proceeding.174  In M.R.C., the mother led the 
biological father to believe she had miscarried, and the father was also 
burdened with a protection from abuse order that prevented him from 
seeing the mother.175  The mother in Baby W. actually believed she had 
miscarried and did not notify the biological father when she eventually 
gave birth.176  Finally, in M.D.K., the father claimed he attempted to 
contact the mother to ask if she needed support, but she continued to 
decline and her mother threatened a restraining order against him.177  In 
the court’s decision, Judge Beier wrote separately to suggest that even if 
a mother wants to distance herself from the father, the father must still 
creatively continue to provide support for the child.178 
Although the Court of Appeals in Baby Girl P. found that the 
biological father did not use all available means to investigate the 
mother’s claim of miscarriage as required by prior court decisions,179 the 
Kansas Supreme Court determined that the statute does not require the 
father to “invade a mother’s privacy to determine whether she is 
pregnant when [he] has sound reasons to believe that she is not.”180 
Baby Girl P. overrules more than ten years of Kansas appellate 
decisions regarding termination of rights for adoption purposes.  The 
evidence of paternal support in Baby Girl P. was less than or at most 
equal to the support other fathers had shown in at least four prior cases 
where parental rights were terminated.  And while the lengthy analysis of 
parental rights in the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in A.A.T. seemed 
to require the termination of Baby Girl P.’s father’s rights, the court 
distinguished the two cases based on the fact that A.A.T.’s father 
appeared six months after the adoption was finalized, and Baby Girl P.’s 
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father asserted his rights during the adoption proceeding.181  This is an 
unfair distinction because the court failed to consider that A.A.T.’s father 
was deceived by the mother and had no knowledge of the birth or 
adoption proceeding until the mother eventually told him the truth six 
months later, after his rights had unknowingly been terminated.  Upon 
learning of his paternity, the biological father made relatively the same 
efforts as Baby Girl P.’s father to assert his parental rights. 
2. Implementation of the Parental Preference Doctrine in Adoption 
Cases 
While the Kansas Court of Appeals held nearly twenty years ago that 
the parental preference doctrine is incorporated in section 59-2136 and 
therefore does not apply on its own,182 the Kansas Supreme Court relied 
solely on the parental preference doctrine in Baby Girl P., stating, 
We do not find in the statutory scheme a legislative call to make the 
assertion of paternal rights a Herculean task.  The preservation of a 
father’s relationship with his child is the starting point of a termination 
proceeding, not the finish line that a father must labor to reach.  The 
statute requires simply that a father make ‘reasonable efforts’ to 
support or communicate with his child.183 
This appears to create a presumption that rights should remain intact 
absent compelling evidence of abuse or neglect, while prior case law 
required “affirmative action to manifest a full commitment to parenting 
responsibilities.”184  Confusion about the minimum levels of support a 
biological father must demonstrate causes uncertainty for both the 
adoptive parents and the biological parent.  Courts must decide once and 
for all how to apply the parental preference doctrine. 
B. Preventing Uncertainty in Future Adoption Cases 
1. How Disruptions in Permanency Effect Children 
Kansas has an interest in an early determination of the “rights, 
interests, and obligations of all parties” involved a child’s life.185  Kansas 
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also has an interest in encouraging adoptions and protecting the adoption 
process by “eliminating the risk of unnecessary controversy that might 
impair . . . finality.”186  Uncertainty regarding whether biological fathers 
may contest adoptions could result in “dissuad[ing] prospective adoptive 
parents from attempting to adopt the children of unwed mothers who . . . 
have chosen for whatever reason not to keep their child and raise it 
themselves.”187  This would “frustrate [a] state’s clear interest in 
encouraging such adoptions and providing stable homes for children.”188 
According to The Best Interests of the Child, a book that “ha[s] 
become the standard for assessing child placement decision-making in 
this country,”189 children are treated differently than adults under the law 
because they are “dependent beings who are not fully competent to 
determine and safeguard their own interests.”190  The state therefore has 
an interest in assuring each child a “membership” within a family 
including at least one parent.191  Children’s mental states differ 
drastically from adults’.192  Their relationships with parental figures are 
essential to their development.193  For example, an infant’s attachment to 
her parents comes from her parents providing the daily “physical care, 
nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation” she needs to thrive.194  
A parent who satisfies these needs becomes the “psychological 
parent.”195  A child with a psychological parent becomes a “wanted 
child” who “feels loved, valued, and wanted by that [parent],” and 
therefore has a higher chance of achievement because she is convinced 
of her human value.196  Adoptive parents who have custody over a child 
in her early infancy have a greater chance of developing a psychological 
                                                                                                                       
 
248, 262–64 n.20 (1983)). 
 186.  See id. (citing Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262–64 n.20). 
 187.  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 898 (Cal. 1995) 
(en banc)). 
 188.  Id. (quoting Michael H., 898 P.2d at 898). 
 189.  Barbara F. Nordhaus, Preface to JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD, at xi (1996).   
 190.  GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., supra note 18989, at 5. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  See id. at 9 (explaining that children “differ from their elders in their mental nature, their 
functioning, their understanding of events, and their reactions to them”). 
 193.  See id. (“[C]hildren have no psychological conception of blood-tie relationships until quite 
late in their development. . . .  What matters to them is the pattern of day-to-day interchanges with 
the adults who take care of them and who, on the strength of such interactions, become the parent 
figures to whom they are attached.”). 
 194.  Id. at 11.  
 195.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 196.  Id. at 13. 
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parent–child relationship.197  Therefore, a delay in the finalization of an 
adoption or the placement of the child in a stable home may result in a 
reduction of critical time to make a child feel “wanted.”198  Further, 
research shows that infants who lose their attachment to their primary 
caregiver have less advanced communication skills and their motor and 
cognitive development suffers.199  These infants also can “become very 
disturbed if they are separated from their primary caregivers,” which 
may cause “conduct disorders and antisocial development.”200 
2. Expedited Termination Proceedings 
Because continuity of relationships is essential for children, and 
disruptions of continuity can result in detriment to healthy development, 
particularly with very young children, adoption proceedings should be 
accelerated.201  Uncertainty in adoptions can negatively affect the ability 
to stabilize the new parent–child relationship due to the lingering fears of 
biological parents revoking consent or coming forward to assert parental 
rights.202  The Kansas Legislature must make it a priority to take 
necessary action so that termination proceedings are expedited, whether 
through legislative action or changing the courts’ internal procedures. 
Children sense time differently than adults, and the passage of time 
for children is magnified, which aggravates anxiety.203  While adults 
measure the passage of time by the clock or a calendar, children sense 
time passage based on the “urgency of their instinctual and emotional 
needs” and are particularly sensitive to periods of long separation.204  
                                                          
 197.  Id.  
 198.  See id. (noting that “temporary placements are often associated with deprivation, 
disruption, or broken attachments.”). 
 199.  See Marcus T. Boccaccini & Eleanor Willemsen, Contested Adoption and the Liberty 
Interest of the Child, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 211, 218 (1998) (citing ATTACHMENT IN THE 
PRESCHOOL YEARS 200–01 (Mark T. Greenberg et al. eds., 1990)). 
 200.  Melissa LaBarge, Comment, “C” Is for Constitution: Recognizing the Due Process Rights 
of Children in Contested Adoptions, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 320 (1999) (quoting Paige Kerchner 
Kaplan, Comment, Putting the Child First in Custody Battles Between Biological Fathers and 
Adoptive Parents, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 907, 933, 935 (1995)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 201.  See GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., supra note 18989, at 22–23 (arguing that the waiting period in 
adoptions is detrimental and should be eliminated).  
 202.  Id. at 22. 
 203.  CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, A JUDGE’S GUIDE: MAKING CHILD-
CENTERED DECISIONS IN CUSTODY CASES 15 (Diane Boyd Rauber ed., 2001) (quoting NAT’L 
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT 
PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (1995)). 
 204.  See GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., supra note 18989, at 41–42.  
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Courts must recognize the sensitivity of child custody cases, particularly 
regarding disputed adoptions, and expedite litigation at the appellate 
level because, “[t]he longer a child remains with the adult who retains 
custody pending appeal, the less likely . . . will it be appropriate to 
change her placement.”205 
Further, any changes to the timeliness of termination proceedings 
must be developed considering both the due process rights of the 
biological parent and the child.  Any procedure should allow enough 
time for the biological parent to assert his rights and demonstrate his 
desire to parent, while at the same time protecting a child’s due process 
rights and promptly resolving the child’s status. 
The federal government recognized the need to expedite proceedings 
involving children when it enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
of 1997 (ASFA).206  The ASFA sought to lessen the amount of time 
children spend in state custody by shortening “time frames for court 
hearings and permanent placement.”207 
In response to legislation such as this, the Kansas Supreme Court 
requested a study of the parental termination appeals processes, setting a 
goal to identify ways to “expedite those appeals while preserving the due 
process rights of all involved.”208  In 2007, the Judicial Council’s 
Appeals from Termination of Parental Rights Advisory Committee made 
a variety of recommendations that could be implemented to reduce 
delays in appellate proceedings.209  The committee noted that the 
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recommends a 
period of no longer than 150 days from the issuance of the trial court 
order for a termination proceeding to be finalized in the appeals 
process.210  Among its recommendations, the committee suggested 
revisions to the Kansas Supreme Court Rules and changes to appellate 
procedures including addition of a special provision to the Notice of 
Appeal that indicates it is a termination proceeding, forming a new 
                                                          
 205.  Id. at 44.  
 206.  Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 207.  Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Expediting the Adoption Process at the Appellate Level, 28 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 121, 122 (1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
 208.  See APPEALS FROM TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADVISORY 
COMM., KAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL APPEALS FROM TERMINATION 
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1 (2007), http://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/ 
Documents/Studies%20and%20Reports/Recent%20Reports/Rpt_ATPR_FinalReport_Nov2007.pdf. 
 209.  See id. at 5–18 (recommending certain changes to appellate procedure as well as other 
areas of the court system). 
 210.  Id. at 2. 
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docketing statement unique to termination proceedings, and limiting the 
briefing period for termination appeals.211  More than five years after the 
committee made its recommendations, none of the proposed Supreme 
Court rule changes have been implemented in Kansas. 
It is time for the Kansas Legislature to recognize the necessity of 
expediting the appeals process when the termination of parental rights for 
adoption purposes are at issue, so that the status of children does not 
remain pending for detrimentally long periods of time.  Immediate action 
must be taken, such as implementing those recommendations from the 
Kansas Judicial Council or passing legislation mandating expedited 
procedures in adoption or parental termination appeals,212 to lift the veil 
of uncertainty currently surrounding adoptions in Kansas. 
3. Amendments to Section 59-2136 
Additionally, the Kansas Legislature must amend KARA to clarify 
the requirements a biological father must meet to maintain his parental 
rights under section 59-2136.  Adding more specific language and 
detailed definitions of troublesome phrases such as “support” could help 
courts set a more consistent standard when making difficult termination 
decisions. 
The ambiguity of section 59-2136 has opened the door for Kansas 
courts to produce inconsistent results when deciding whether to 
terminate parental rights, which in turn will detrimentally affect the 
children involved.  While section 59-2136(h)(1) provides seven 
conditions under which a court may terminate parental rights,213 there is 
                                                          
 211.  See id. at 5–13. 
 212.  Many states have statutory provisions that mandate expedited processes involving adoption 
and parental termination.  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-309(b) (2012) (providing 
that “[a]n appeal from any [adoption] order . . . must be expedited”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §112-
a(3) (McKinney 2010) (requiring court administrators at the trial level to establish rules to expedite 
adoption proceedings); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(a) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that 
appeals involving parental termination are to be given preference and accelerated over other civil 
cases); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-704(f) (West 2002) (providing that any appeals from adoption 
orders shall be considered and resolved “as expeditiously as possible”). 
 213.  The seven conditions are as follows: 
(A) The father abandoned or neglected the child after having knowledge of the child’s 
birth; 
(B) the father is unfit as a parent or incapable of giving consent; 
(C) the father has made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child 
after having knowledge of the child’s birth; 
(D) the father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause 
to provide support for the mother during the six months prior to the child’s birth; 
(E) the father abandoned the mother after having knowledge of the pregnancy; 
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little authority to help the court determine what evidence is sufficient for 
termination.  Some Kansas appellate decisions have interpreted the 
statute to mean that “a father has a duty to take affirmative action to 
manifest a full commitment to parenting responsibilities and to exercise 
reasonable diligence to discover whether the mother has lied to him 
concerning the existence of the child.”214  However Baby Girl P. 
suggests a father must make only “reasonable efforts” to maintain his 
rights.215 
As evidenced by the discrepancy in decisions by Kansas courts, 
“support” as it appears in sections 59-2136(h)(1)(C) and (D) is a 
troublesome word.  Whether the term is intended to mean financial or 
emotional support is unclear, and various cases decided by Kansas courts 
have produced different results.216  Further, the level of support is also 
undefined.  While the statute instructs that courts may disregard 
“incidental visitations, contacts, communications or contributions,”217 
Kansas courts have been inconsistent in interpreting what amount of 
contact or financial resources qualifies as more than “incidental.”218 
Kansas House Bill No. 2482, considered in 2012, attempted to 
reconcile this disparity by adding a provision that defined “support.”219  
The proposed amendment added section 59-2136(j), which stated, “[f]or 
the purposes of this section, ‘support’ means any tender of (1) significant 
monetary support or (2) significant nonmonetary support.”220  While it 
remains unknown how the addition of this provision would affect future 
court decisions, members of the Kansas Legislature at least recognized 
the need to qualify the meaning of “support.”  Iowa’s termination statute, 
for example, provides a clearer, more specific outline for resolving these 
difficult issues.221  This statute utilizes an affirmative list of actions a 
                                                                                                                       
 
(F) the birth of the child was the result of rape of the mother; or 
(G) the father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive 
years next preceding the filing of the petition. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(1) (Supp. 2012). 
 214.  In re M.R.C., 217 P.3d 50, 56 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (citing In re A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 
1184 (Kan. 2008)). 
 215.  In re Baby Girl P., 242 P.3d 1168, 1174 (Kan. 2010) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2136(h)(1)(C)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 216.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 217.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(2)(B). 
 218.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 219.  See H.B. 2482, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012). 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (West Supp. 2013). 
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parent must demonstrate to preserve his parental rights222 and includes a 
number of factors, including a few directed specifically at putative 
fathers,223 that a court may consider when determining whether the 
parent demonstrated the requisite actions to maintain his rights.  The 
statute expands on the definition of support by providing that a parent 
may pay “a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with the putative 
father’s means,”224 and also specifies that a father must show “a 
willingness to assume custody of the child rather than merely objecting 
to the termination of parental rights.”225  These two provisions alone 
would provide Kansas courts with additional tools to help harmonize 
their inconsistent parental termination decisions, particularly in regards 
to how much financial support is sufficient. 
Additionally, the Judicial Council Family Law Advisory Committee 
issued a report in 2010 regarding Senate Bill 255, which proposed 
amending the existing law concerning stepparent adoptions.226  In this 
report the committee recommended the legislature consider “amending 
the statutes in order to provide consistency with regard to the standards 
used to determine fitness of a parent.”227  The committee recommended 
that the legislature utilize the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children 
(CINC Code)228 as a basis for the amendments.229  The CINC Code, 
found in section 38-2269 of the Kansas Statutes, suggests a list of factors 
to consider when making decisions about termination of parental 
rights.230  These CINC Code factors provide some of the specificity that 
                                                          
 222.  See id. § 600A.8(3)(a)(1) (“If the child is less than six months of age when the termination 
hearing is held, a parent is deemed to have abandoned the child unless the parent does all of the 
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 224.  Id. § 600A.8(3)(a)(2)(d). 
 225.  Id. § 600A.8(3)(a)(1)(a). 
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 229.  FAMILY LAW ADVISORY COMM., supra note 226, at 6–7. 
 230.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269(b).  These factors include: 
(1) Emotional illness, mental illness, mental deficiency or physical disability of the 
parent, of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the ongoing 
physical, mental and emotional needs of the child; 
(2) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally or sexually cruel or abusive 
nature; 
(3) the use of intoxicating liquors or narcotic or dangerous drugs of such duration or 
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is lacking in the current adoption statute.  Drawing from the proposals in 
House Bill No. 2482, examples from other state statutes, and the CINC 
Code, the Kansas Legislature should have the necessary tools to draft 
amendments to help clarify the ambiguity in the current statute. 
Clarifying and adding specific requirements a biological father must 
meet  to maintain his parental rights is essential to prevent future 
uncertainty for adoptive parents.  It is particularly important to clarify the 
meaning of “support” found in section 59-2136(h)(1)(C) and (D).  
Additionally, courts should consider the children’s due process rights and 
make custody related cases, especially those on appeal, a high priority 
and expedite these decisions to make a final determination of a child’s 
status.  Expedited procedures will help reach finality for all parties so 
that cases, such as the two-and-a-half year litigation in Baby Girl P., do 
not remain unresolved for extended periods of time. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Adoption plays a positive role in society, allowing biological parents 
to relinquish their rights to allow a child to be raised in home with 
parents who can better provide them with a stable, loving life.  While 
KARA implemented processes to make the adoption process fair and 
                                                                                                                       
 
nature as to render the parent unable to care for the ongoing physical, mental or 
emotional needs of the child; 
(4) physical, mental or emotional abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child; 
(5) conviction of a felony and imprisonment; 
(6) unexplained injury or death of another child or stepchild of the parent or any child in 
the care of the parent at the time of injury or death; 
(7) failure of reasonable efforts made by appropriate public or private agencies to 
rehabilitate the family; 
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conditions to meet the needs of the child; and 
(9) whether the child has been in extended out of home placement as a result of actions or 
inactions attributable to the parent and one or more of the factors listed in subsection (c) 
apply. 
Id.  Section 38-2269(c) states: 
In addition to the [factors in section 38-2269(b)], when a child is not in the physical 
custody of a parent, the court, shall consider, but is not limited to, the following: 
(1) Failure to assure care of the child in the parental home when able to do so; 
(2) failure to maintain regular visitation, contact or communication with the child or with 
the custodian of the child; 
(3) failure to carry out a reasonable plan approved by the court directed toward the 
integration of the child into a parental home; and 
(4) failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of substitute physical care and 
maintenance based on ability to pay. 
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efficient, unfortunately there are situations in which courts must make 
difficult decisions about who should raise the child.  A biological parent 
has a constitutionally protected right to raise his child.  However, in 
certain messy situations, a biological father, who may know very little 
about the pregnancy and birth of his child, faces termination of his 
parental rights for an adoption proceeding to be finalized.  While Kansas 
courts have required the biological father to show sufficient support for 
the child to retain his rights, a recent Kansas Supreme Court decision 
seemed to reverse all prior case law, leaving ambiguity and uncertainty 
in future adoption proceedings.  Kansas courts and the Kansas 
Legislature must act to reconcile these discrepancies in favor of a law 
that has better defined standards for what a biological father must do to 
retain his parental rights, and expedites appellate procedures considering 
the child and biological parent’s rights so that all parties can reach a 
quick and final determination of custody. 
 
